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SONS VERSUS NEPHEWS:
A HIGHLAND JAMBI ALLIANCE AT
WAR WITH THE BRITISH EAST INDIA
COMPANY, CA. 1800
Heinzpeter Znoj1
At the end of the eighteenth century, the southwest coast of Sumatra suddenly,
and until today irreversibly, declined in importance in regional trade. First Penang,
and later Singapore, with their free trade regimes, made the Straits of Malacca once
again the dominant marketplace in Southeast Asia. This was the beginning of the end
of British colonial enterprise in Sumatra, located as it was at a backwater of the new
economic system. The highlands of Jambi, however, saw their economic and political
role enhanced.
In this article I ask how this crucial shift in strategic location affected a region
hitherto little considered in Sumatran historiography, namely the southern parts of
highland Jambi. Luckily enough, a contemporary narrative provides insights into the
regional politics and social upheavals during this historical watershed. It is a court
drama which started at Muko-Muko on the west coast when the heir apparent of the
Sultanate of Anak Sungai rebelled against his uncle, the Sultan, and which found its
unspectacular end in the gold-mining area of Pangkalan Jambu in the eastern
highlands.2 It deals with the desperate attempts of the British East India Company to
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control its business from the west coast at a time when money, people, and
opportunities all moved to the east. It is fueled by the passions of a conflict over
succession that ended with the abolition of matriliny in the Sultanate of Anak Sungai.
And it confirms the astonishing fact that all important gold-mining settlements of
central Sumatra, hitherto well-known as animist hotbeds, came under the control of
reformist Islamic movements at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The analysis
of these events provides some insights into the particular geography and form of
highland Jambi resistance against the Dutch conquest a century later.
Little is known about the Jambi highlands before the twentieth century. We
know much more about the coastal Sultanates to the east and west where the
Europeans were stationed and which had been made relatively strong and stable by
the trading arrangements with the European companies. In the interior, polities were
more fragmented and less stable, but not necessarily less powerful during the rule of
particular chiefs and their allies.3 The changeable polities of highland Jambi, as well as
the biased chronicles of the Europeans on the coast, have in my opinion contributed to
an underestimation of the role of the area in regional developments. Even if the
importance of relations between the big Sultanates downstream and smaller polities
upstream has been acknowledged in principle,4 the perspective in Sumatran
historiography, with the exception of Minangkabau, remains largely focused on the
downstream ports.
If compared to the history of Minangkabau relatively little is known of the
history of the adjacent southern part of the central Sumatran highlands, this is due not
simply to a lack of data, but also to the way the available data have been interpreted.
Even if the British and Dutch, with posts restricted to the coast, did get information
from the highlands, they were only minimally interested in the agency of the hill
people themselves. In their minds, the highlands were the source of an unreliable flow
of gold, and the locus of vast fallow lands awaiting colonial development.5 Highland
politics, since there was no recognizable political center, were understood in terms of
rebellion and anarchy. Even the identity of the inhabitants was hardly acknowledged,
as they were described in more familiar terms, as Minangkabau mixed with
"Palembangers" and Javanese. And if the term Kerinci was used, it tended to include
the whole Jambi highlands, not the Kerinci valley proper. This colonial perspective
continues to influence contemporary historiography, and it is the reason why the
political landscape of the highlands at the period for which data begin to be available is
still little understood. The pioneering works of Rapp on the strong highland federation
along the Mesumai and Merangin under Pengeran Temenggung in the late nineteenth
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century,6 Bill Watson on the history of village political structure in Kerinci,7 Hashim
and Kathirithamby-Wells on the Sultanates of Indrapura and Muko-Muko on the west
coast,8 and Barbara Andaya on the gift-relationship between upstream and
downstream polities in Jambi and Palembang9 provide us with a base on which to
build.
The agents of the East India Company were particularly hampered by
ignorance when it came to matriliny. Anak Sungai was the only area on the southwest
coast under British control where the majority of the population, including the elite,
was organized according to matrilineal principles. And as I will argue, the rebellion of
the heir apparent of the Sultanate of Anak Sungai had one of its sources in a conflict
over the validity of matrilineal succession. British sources referred to matrilineal
inheritance in passing, but there is no evidence that they ever understood it clearly.
Not even Marsden, the keen observer who wrote a chapter about the Minangkabau,
mentions anything pertaining to their peculiar social structure.10 If later the notion of
matriliny was to become the dominant paradigm in Minangkabau ethnography and
historiography that would explain the working of local society, during the rule of the
East India Company nothing like it was at hand. Manipulations of local politics by the
servants of the EIC therefore remained anything but skillful. In taking sides in
succession conflicts, officials of the EIC tended strongly to initiate patrilineal descent
among the local elite, to the point of never formally acknowledging matrilineal
succession.11 In fact, it is only in the 1860s, when the "mother-right" had become an
important issue in the evolutionary social theory of the day, that Dutch administrators
started to understand more fully matriliny among the Minangkabau. But the British at
the turn of the nineteenth century were not yet comfortable with the idea that within
their territory rules of succession other than patrilineal ones should be recognized. It is
therefore necessary to read the sources very critically as far as they represent kinship
ties among the ruling elite, and thereby go a step further than scholars of the area have
hitherto done.
Highland Jambi at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century
Two British sources and the Syair Mukomuko, a court chronicle from the early
nineteenth century, bring to life the political landscape of highland Jambi at the turn of
the nineteenth century. Hastings Dare's account of 1804-05 on a punitive expedition
into Sungai Tenang and Serampas is well-known to us since it is in part reproduced in
the third edition of Marsden's History of Sumatra. Barnes's account of a mission
^ G. Ch. Rapp, Resultaten van het onderzoek in het gebied van den Pengeran Temenggoeng, (Jambi, 1931).
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Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries," in Indonesia 21 (April 1976): 63-84.
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through Kerinci to Pangkalan Jambu in 1818 has been reprinted several times and
recently been edited in full and annotated by Jeya Kathirithamby-Wells.12 Barnes's
mission was ordered by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles shortly after his return from his
own famous journey to Minangkabau. The Syair Mukomuko, as well as the factory
records of the British residency at Bengkulu, have equally been made available in
recent years.13
In trying to understand religious developments, broader political structures
and the trade networks of which these areas were part in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, I was struck how fragmented the southern Jambi highlands were
in these respects. The breakdown of one trade route could throw a whole highland
region into virtual isolation for decades. The southernmost parts of the highlands, for
instance, drifted into marginality with the decline of the old gold-trading corridor
linking the eastern foothills with the west coast.14 And the forests of the western slopes
of the Barisan, long criss-crossed by footpaths and dotted with solid huts in which the
itinerant traders spent the night, became almost totally deserted, with the result that
today they are looked at as a refuge of untouched nature and have recently been
declared a national park. But the opening up of new economic opportunities for the
highlanders could trigger a period of fast cultural development and pressure for
assimilation with the wider Malay culture. This history of stop-and-go-integration into
wider social developments is typical for many highland areas of Southeast Asia. Even
a seemingly marginal and isolated area may have lived through periods of intense
contact, in- and outmigration, and mainstream cultural development. This is what may
have happened in Kerinci, Sungai Tenang, and Serampas over a very long time.
Religion is one of the areas that sensitively register the ups and downs of
integrative developments. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a religious
movement reformed daily life in parts of Kerinci and further downstream in
Pangkalan Jambu in the same thorough way as the Wahhabi-inspired Padri movement
did in Minangkabau. This fact is not yet well established among historians of the Padri
movement in Sumatra, and I will argue for it in the last part of this article. The
movement had a strong impact on later historical developments in the gold-mining
areas and along the main trade routes in highland Jambi. How far, if at all, the
influence of the Muslim reformers of the early nineteenth century reached south of
Kerinci and Pangkalan Jambu into Serampas and Sungai Tenang is one of the
questions I will address at the end of this article. The history of the "rebel" Sultanate in
Pangkalan Jambu at the turn of the nineteenth century sheds enough light on this
question to enable a tentative answer.
12
 Jeyamalar Kathirithamby-Wells, Thomas Barnes" Expedition to Kerinci in 1818: Edited, Annotated and with
an Introduction by f. Kathirithamby-Wells, Occasional Paper No. 7 (Canterbury: Centre of South-East Asian
Studies University of Kent at Canterbury, 1986).
13
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1965); Hashim et al., The Syair Mukomuko.
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questions pertaining to this area in much greater detail in a forthcoming book.
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The Gold of Highland Jambi
Barbara Andaya has vividly described how the eastern foothills of highland
Jambi had become rich and powerful since the sixteenth century, due to the growing of
pepper, and later, the panning and mining of gold. The area attracted many settlers,
especially from Minangkabau, and the Sultans of Jambi were unable to exercise much
control over this upstream area.15 Highland Jambi was to remain, due to massive
immigration of miners from Minangkabau and peasants from the west coast, the most
important source of gold in the whole of Sumatra until the end of the nineteenth
century.16 This was part of an economic and political mobilization of the highlands that
simultaneously engendered in Minangkabau the social and religious development so
well described by Christine Dobbin.17 As a whole it contributed to the financial ruin of
the pepper enterprises of the Dutch and British East India Companies on the west
coast, which became at the time a mere hinterland in an economy oriented towards the
Straits of Malakka. Yet even if it involved thousands of gold-miners and huge numbers
of traders and peasants that supplied them, little is known about the polities that
controlled highland Jambi's gold production.18
The southern highlands of Sumatra were a source of gold as important as
Minangkabau. We know that gold was mined in Minangkabau by the second century
AD,19 and there is evidence that gold mining in the southern parts of Sumatra goes
back at least a thousand years.20 Together with the mines of Lebong, the highland
Jambi gold mines were in all likelihood the sources of the gold of Srivijaya from the
seventh through the fourteenth centuries. The highland Jambi gold mines must equally
have been the major source of gold traded at the west coast port of Indrapura during
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indrapura was known for its legendary gold
mines in the seventeenth century, and before the Dutch arrived, it was an important
port with links to Aceh.21 Close to the southern end of Lake Kerinci, a Lingga and Yoni
stone monument22 testifies to the existence of a trade route from Pangkalan Jambu to
the west coast at a time of strong Hindu influence, i.e. probably well before the
fifteenth century. In the latter part of the nineteenth century the gold mines of
Pangkalan Jambu, Batang Asai, and Limun in the Jambi highlands were the most
15
 Andaya, To Live as Brothers, pp. 151-52.
16
 John N. Miksic, "Traditional Sumatran Trade," Bulletin - Ecole Franςaise d'Extrfeme-Orient 74 (1985):
423-67, see especially pp. 451-2.
17
 Christine Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy: Central Sumatra, 1784-1847 (London:
Curzon Press, 1983).
18
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19
 Dobbin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 176.
20
 John N. Miksic, Old Javanese Gold (Singapore: Ideation, 1990), p. 31; Simone Prodolliet and Heinzpeter
Znoj, "Illusory World and Economic Realities: The Gold of Lebong," in The Rejang of Southern Sumatra, ed.
Victor King (Hull: University of Hull Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), p. 60; Robert S. Wicks,
Money, Markets, and Trade in Early Southeast Asia (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1992), p. 234.
21
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22
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prolific of the whole of Sumatra, before the rubber boom of the early twentieth century
virtually put an end to gold production there.23
To provide an idea of the magnitude of this production, a few numbers may
suffice. Marsden notes that every year 600 ounces (17 kg) of gold reached Muko-Muko
and 10,000 to 12,000 ounces (280-340 kg) reached Padang, while an equal amount was
traded to the eastern parts of the island.24 British sources in the 1780s estimated the
annual exports from Padang at 200 to 240 kg.25 Crawfurd estimated the total
production of gold in Sumatra at 1,009 kg annually.26 Francis mentions for an
unspecified time in the past, a time still under British rule, that 10,000 tahil of gold (400
kg) used to reach Muko-Muko annually from Kerinci,27 Batang Asai, and Limun, and
that it was exchanged mainly against opium.28 Perhaps this was during the rule of
Sultan Pasisir Barat Syah (1752-1789) about whom the Syair Mukomuko says: "Selama
bagίnda menjadi raja / terlalu ramai negeri Mukomuko / banyaklah dagang datang berniaga /
menukar emas, apiun Benggala."29 The wide variation in the amounts of gold brought to
Muko-Muko reflects the politics of gold trade in the interior and also the varying
attractiveness of Muko-Muko as a market. Francis notes that in his own time (1833) the
gold of highland Jambi was mainly traded to Padang. Since it is unlikely that gold
from Minangkabau reached Muko-Muko in any quantity at any time, the 400 kg
previously delivered to Muko-Muko annually must have come from highland Jambi
alone. It is therefore a safe guess that highland Jambi produced in the magnitude of
hundreds of kilograms of gold yearly during part of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Considering the limited levels of technology and capital this compares rather
favorably with the average yearly production of a little under two tons of the two
biggest modern Dutch gold mines in Lebong that yielded about 70 percent of the
Netherlands Indies7 total gold production between 1897 and 1940.30
The "Rebellion" of Tuanku Mudo Zainal Abidin
Anak Sungai was probably the most prolific pepper area on the Sumatran west
coast during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. While it was still part of the
Indrapura Sultanate, it was disputed first between Aceh and the Dutch, and later
23
 O. L. Helfrich, "Bijdrage tot de kermis van Boven-Djambi," Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch
Aardrijkskundig Genootschap (1903-04), p. 992; J. Tidemann, Djambi (Amsterdam: Koninklyke Vereeniging
"Koloniaal Institut," 1938), pp. 225-26.
24
 William Marsden, The History of Sumatra, p. 168.
25
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26
 J. Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, vol. IΠ (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1820), p.
486, quoted in Wolfgang Marschall, "Metallurgie und frίihe Besiedelungsgeschichte Indonesiens,"
Ethnologica 4 (1968): 245.
27
 Since there are no gold deposits of any importance in Kerinci itself, this very probably refers to the
mines of Pangkalan Jambu.
28
 E. A. Francis, "Benkoelen in 1833," in Tijdschrift voor NeerlandschΊndie IV,1 (1841): 417-450, esp. 427.
29
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traders who came to barter gold for Bengal opium." Hashim et al., The Syair Mukomuko, canto v, pp. 48-49.
30
 Prodolliet et al., "Illusory Worlds," p. 69.
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between the Dutch and the British.31 Prolific as it was, Anak Sungai was also prone to
fierce internal conflicts that repeatedly led to the breakdown of pepper production.
The rebellion of the heir apparent of the Sultanate of Anak Sungai, Tuanku
Mudo Zainal Abidin, marks a critical phase not only for the Sultanate but also for the
EIC (East India Company) west coast settlements and, ultimately, for the highland as
well. The rebellion began in 1787. Two years earlier, in 1785, the former West Sumatran
presidency had been reduced to the status of a mere residency, which meant a severe
reduction in finance and personnel. Pepper production had been in steady decline
since the end of the 1770s, and many inhabitants moved from the coast to the
highlands. The British enterprise never recovered.32
Tuanku Mudo Zainal Abidin had been brought up at Bengkulu under the
tutelage of governor Roger Carter (1760-1767). Obviously the Company expected him
to become a reliable partner in governing the Anak Sungai Sultanate. In 1779 he had
been appointed Company pepper surveyor at Bantal, a job that should have helped to
implement the EICs system of forced cultivation and at the same time check the power
of the "tyrannical" Sultan Pasisir Barat Syah.33 Zainal Abidin soon turned out to be an
enterprising man, involving himself in the trade with the people from the interior.34 He
was so successful in promoting this trade that the local British agents, Peter Jack Cox in
Muko-Muko and Richard Nevin in Bantal, complained sharply about the paucity of the
private business they were able to make for themselves.
Their hatred for the heir apparent was so strong that Cox pulled down Zainal
Abidin's house and Nevin denied him the resale of rice and salt. This occurred
immediately before the "rebellion" of the heir apparent. It seems obvious therefore that
the main conflict in the Sultanate was initially not one between the Sultan and his
nephew (and would-be successor), but between the latter and the two Company
servants. In a reversal of its favors, the Company turned to the old Sultan and pressed
him to discipline the heir apparent. The Sultan duly asked his successor to perform a
humiliating act of submission, namely to ceremonially scatter yellow rice, which was
normally done by a female member of the court. Zainal Abidin refused and was
disinherited in favor of the eldest son of the Sultan.35
Enraged by this and the actions of the British against him, Zainal Abidin
planned to attack Muko-Muko, the capital of Anak Sungai, and forcibly claim the
Sultanate. The British immediately sent a military force against him. After having
Richard Nevin murdered and the Pasar at Bantal burnt down, Zainal Abidin escaped,
carrying off the British agent of Ipuh, a certain Robert Leister. He held Leister hostage
in Serampas between 1787 and 1789.
It is no wonder that an enterprising local ruler should try to dominate trade
with the interior. When the EIC had taken control of the pepper trade, since the end of
the seventeenth century, the local chiefs who had previously derived much of their
income from the sale of pepper had been forced to look for alternative trading
opportunities. They had found them invariably in the trade with people from outside
31
 Kathirithamby-Wells, "The Inderapura Sultanate."
32
 Kathirithamby-Wells, The British West Sumatran Presidency.
33
 Ibid., pp. 94,207.
34
 Hashim et al., The Syair Mukomuko, p. 17.
35
 Ibid., p. 17.
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the control of the Company. An additional source of income for them was fines. And
indeed, the Syaίr Muko-Muko denounces the Tuanku Mudo Zainal Abidin as a greedy
collector of fines.36 These fines formed the basis of the trading capital he needed to
attract sellers from the highlands. When the pepper trade declined, in the last quarter
of the eighteenth century,37 the EIC was eager to get rid of such enterprising and
successful trading chiefs and take the business with the highlands into their own
hands.
Zainal Abiding success as a trader rested on alliances with highland chiefs who
were also to become his main allies during his subsequent campaign against the EIC.
Probably already before the rebellion he had allied with the Pemuncak Pamanaka
Sutan of Pangkalan Jambu and to that end arranged the Pemuncak's marriage with his
own sister, Tenku Putri.38 The fact that Zainal Abidin's sister and his mother
accompanied him on his escape to Serampas is evidence that such affinal ties indeed
already existed and had to be protected. Such a close relationship to the chief of one of
the most important sources of gold in the highlands made Zainal Abidin a potentially
very powerful ruler at Muko-Muko, a ruler who might have had more leverage against
the EIC than its representatives could tolerate.
Zainal Abidin's "rebellion'7 was thus no doubt at least partly a reaction to
provocation by the EIC's local agents. In the immediate aftermath of his escape, he did
not seem to have a clear idea of how to proceed. Initially he waited in Serampas for an
opportunity to take over the Sultanate. Serampas was an obvious place to stay for him,
since at this crossroads he was able to divert goods from the east on their way to
Muko-Muko or Ipuh and thus build up pressure against the Sultan and the EIC. The
British negotiated his return to the coast and even convinced the Sultan to reinstate
him as heir apparent. But Zainal Abidin did not return, and at the same time his
position deteriorated when he fell out with his Serampas hosts after killing two village
chiefs (Depati) there. He and his followers had to move closer to the west coast again,
to the Menjuto river, where the frustrating negotiations with the Company continued.
Pressed by British troops, the party moved on to Indrapura, which was under Dutch
control. The Sultanate of Indrapura had always tried to maintain some influence in
questions of succession involving the Sultanate of Anak Sungai, which had separated
from it in the course of a civil war in 1691. Perhaps Zainal Abidin tried there to
mobilize support for his cause. But the Sultana of Indrapura refused her help, anxious
to avoid trouble with the EIC.39
It may have been about at this time that Zainal Abidin changed his strategy,
giving up his plans of becoming Sultan at Muko-Muko and instead setting his sights
on Pangkalan Jambu, the home of his brother-in-law, Pemuncak Pamanaka Sutan.
Instead of hoping to control the gold trade on the west coast, which was in decline due
to the emerging competition of markets on the Straits of Malakka, it had now become
Zainal Abidin's aim to take part in building a powerful polity around the gold mines
of Pangkalan Jambu.
36
 Ibid., p. 49, canto v/35.
37
 Kathirithamby-Wells, The British West Sumatran Presidency, p. 217.
38
 When they mention him for the first time about a year after Zainal Abidin's flight, the sources already
call the Pemuncak the brother-in-law of the rebel. See Hashim et al., The Syair Mukomuko, p. 19.
39
 Hashim et al., The Syair Mukomuko, pp. 18-19.
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Indeed, the winds of change blew eastward at the time, and Zainal Abidin's
trek to the eastern foothills is emblematic for the shift of fortunes from the west coast to
the highlands and the Straits of Malacca that occurred at the time of his rebellion. Not
only had the British West Sumatran possessions been reduced from their presidency
status to that of a mere residency in 1785, but a year later the East India Company
founded a new residency at Penang to take advantage of the swiftly expanding private
trade in the Straits, adding the pressure of competition to the loss of status for the
agents at Sumatra's west coast.
Late in May, 1789, Zainal Abidin retreated from the Indrapura coast via Tapan
to Pulau Sangkar in Kerinci. Eventually, his own mother, wife, and his eldest son,
Sutan Si Kunda, who had stayed behind in Indrapura, returned to Muko-Muko, forced
back by the Company. Only about a month after Zainal Abidin's departure to the
highlands, the Sultan, his uncle, died in July 1789, but the nephew failed to show up to
claim the title, preferring the prospects of a fresh start at Pangkalan Jambu to the
difficult position he had maneuvered himself into vis-a-vis the British. In April 1790,
an expedition led by Captain Hamilton and the Bugis under Daeng Ma'ruppa tracked
down Zainal Abidin in Kerinci. He escaped while his mother, who had rejoined his
party, was brought back to Muko-Muko. Zainal Abidin himself never tried again to
repossess Anak Sungai.
A Patrilinear Revolution
The British sources,40 the Syaίr Mukomuko and the editors of the Syair all depict
the conflict of succession of 1787-89 in the Sultanate of Anak Sungai as taking place
within a single patrilineage. According to this version, the eldest son and heir
apparent, Zainal Abidin, was replaced by a younger son, Tuan Sutan Takdirullah alias
Sultan Khalifatullah Inayat Syah (see Figure 2: Two versions of succession to the
Sultanate of Anak Sungai).
There are reasons to doubt this representation. I am convinced that the conflict
was made all the more heated and protracted because it involved the deviation from
the hitherto accepted rule of matrilineal succession to the title of Sultan of Anak
Sungai. Such a breaking of the rules would have meant a revolution, because the local
chiefs, the Menteri Empat Belas (the "fourteen Menteri"), would have lost their kin-
based influence at the court in Muko-Muko. We know that Anak Sungai used to be a
staunchly matrilinear Sultanate following the Bodi Caniago tradition of Minangkabau
adat, where even the title of the Sultan was inherited by one of the Sultan's sororal
AΛ
nephews. Previously, also Indrapura to the north had had this system; patrilineal
succession there was established in 1660, at the occasion of Dutch assumption of
control over the Sultanate. For the Dutch, dealing with a single patrilineal clan was far
more efficient than dealing with a far-flung matrilinear kin-group that had more
democratic notions of rule. The chiefs of Anak Sungai, then part of the Sultanate of
Indrapura, vehemently opposed the new rules of succession. A long civil war ensued
40
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Figure 2: Two versions of succession to the Sultanate of Anak Sungai
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that led to the breakaway, with the help of the British East India Company, of Anak
Sungai as a Sultanate independent of Indrapura.43 The Menteri Empat Belas had again
to defend matrilinear succession to the Sultanate in 1728, when Sultan Kecil
Muhammad Syah tried to make his own son his successor. They killed the Sultan and
chose Merah Bangun alias Sultan Gundam Syah as successor.44 The British who, like
the Dutch at Indrapura, would have preferred the more familiar and convenient
patrilineal system, had to accept this.
According to the Syair Mukomuko, the successor of Sultan Gundam Syah was his
own son, who ruled as Sultan Pasisir Barat Syah.45 If this were true, 1752 would have
been the year of a patrilinear revolution, and the Menteri Empat Belas would finally
have had to submit to the wishes of the British. The editors of the Syair do not address
this important question, accepting the Syair's representation of a patrilinear succession
in 1752, just as they accept its representation of the conflict over succession of 1787-89
as taking place within one patrician. Given the history of Anak Sungai, one would
expect a strong reaction by the Menteri on the occasion of this supposed first
partilineal succession to the Sultanate, in 1752. But there is no evidence for this. The
conflict of succession between Zainal Abidin and the Sultan thirty-five years later,
however, is in the magnitude of the reaction one would expect for a patrilinear
revolution. Even the Syair notes that Zainal Abidin had the consent of all fourteen
Menteri before he set out to claim the Sultanate by force. That the planned attack
would indeed have been in defense of matrilinear succession is further suggested by
the explicit mention of the maternal nephews of the Menteri Empat Belas who took up
arms together with them: "Setelah sudah bicara dan rasan / kumpullah Menteri dengan
anak kemanakan / memigang senjata bebilang tangan / negeri Mukomuko hendak
dilanggarkan."*6 Had the conflict of succession only been one between two sons of the
Sultan, the Menteri Empat Belas would hardly have bothered. What difference would
it have made to them if the apparently unpopular Zainal Abidin would have been
replaced by a younger brother or half-brother? But if, as I suggest, the Sultan did try to
make a son instead of a maternal nephew his successor, the Menteri's own interests
would have been touched. As a matter of fact, their reaction follows precisely the
pattern of the conflict of succession of 1728, when the Menteri Empat Belas killed
Sultan Kecil Muhammad Syah for installing his own son as his successor. It is only the
swift reaction of the British, who sent a force under Captain Hamilton to protect Sultan
Pasisir Barat Syah, that prevented the Menteri from killing him.
In matrilineal societies like Anak Sungai in the eighteenth century, the mother's
brother is, in his social functions, more important than the father. I have mentioned
that the British agents never understood matriliny. But it is still a striking fact that the
British sources completely fail to address the central role of the relationship between
maternal uncles (mamak) and sororal nephews (kemanakan) in Anak Sungai society.
They don't even mention these kin terms. In their discourse about descent there is only
room for fathers and sons. How credible is a representation of descent in a matrilineal
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society that uses exclusively agnatic terms? It can certainly not be taken at face value.
In making sense of these representations, the authors7 ignorance and interest have to
be taken into account. I don't think that the British were merely ignorant of the rules of
descent in the Anak Sungai Sultanate. Rather I believe that if they consistently wrote
only about sons instead of sons and nephews, this was part of the symbolic violence
they used to further their interests, which consisted in isolating the circumscribed
patrician of the Sultan from the rest of the local elite, the Menteri Empat Belas.
The Syaίr itself is no less apt at using this kind of symbolic violence. Composed
by the son-in law of Sultan Khalifatullah Inayat Syah during the late years of his reign,
it should be seen as one effort to legitimize his rule and to confirm the new principle of
patrilinear succession. To achieve this aim it repeatedly stresses the "distinguished
descent77 of the ruler,47 represents previous successions as passing from father to son,
and depicts the conflict of succession of 1787-89 as a conflict within a patrilineage.
Calling both Zainal Abidin, the nephew of the old Sultan, and the latter's son Tuan
Sutan Takdirullah, "eldest son,77 the Syair creates a typical confusion that is caused by,
and intended to accomplish, the total suppression of the principle of succession from
maternal uncle to sororal nephew. The editors of the Syair Mukomuko try to explain this
inconsistency by emending the translation to say that Tuan Sutan Takdirullah was the
ruling Sultan's eldest son by a second wife, while Zainal Abidin was the eldest son by
his first wife—an assumption for which there is no evidence.48 Alternatively, they
suggest that calling the successor "eldest son77 was an honorific for Tuan Sutan
Takdirullah, who should not be represented as having superseded his elder brother.
In making my own interpretation, I am thus reading against the grain of
patrilineal representation in the Syair's narration, drawing on such inconsistencies and
logical flaws to support my claims. Perhaps the most obvious inconsistency in the
account of the Tuanku Mudo7s rebellion is that he should have had very little cause at
all to stand up against the Sultan, since he was the heir apparent and the Sultan was
already old (he died two years into the rebellion, after a rule of thirty-seven years).
Only the overriding of succession principles on the part of the Sultan and the British
would have been a reasonable motive for him to overthrow the Sultan.
There were others with a more pressing interest in provoking a conflict over
succession in Anak Sungai: the EIC7s local agents and their superiors at Bengkulu.
After the EIC's west Sumatra territories were reduced from a presidency to a residency
just two years previously they lost annual finances close to £ 38,000.49 In their sudden
and desperate need for money they chose to remove their successful competitor in
private trade, Zainal Abidin, by first trying to push him out of business through a
variety of means and then by instigating the Sultan to disinherit him by switching to
patrilinear succession, thus forcing the legitimate heir apparent into rebellion.
The editors of the Syair fail to address this deeper cause of the disturbances in
Anak Sungai. The fact that these disturbances continued for more than twenty years,
until the death of Zainal Abidin's main ally, Pemuncak Pamanaka Sutan of Pangkalan
Jambu in 1811, reflects continuing turmoil within Anak Sungai as a consequence of the
patrilineal revolution that had deprived the Menteri Empat Belas of their power at
court. The new Sultan felt particularly threatened when the highland alliance burnt
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down villages close to Ipuh, in 1804.50 It was he who asked the British to assist him—
and he did not ask the Menteri Empat Belas for help. The British complied once more,
defeating the "rebels" in Sungai Tenang the following year. But only after the ultimate
demise of the highland alliance in 1811 could the Sultan really feel secure.51 It is in my
opinion no coincidence that the Syair was composed by the ruling Sultan's son-in-law,
Raden Anom Zainal Abidin, at this very moment when Sultan Khalifatullah Inayat
Syah's patrilineage triumphed.52
The introduction of the patrilinear succession principle in the Sultanate of Anak
Sungai thus had immediate causes that had nothing to do with religion. But the
reformist movements of the last quarter of the eighteenth century, which promoted the
introduction of the shaήah, and which originated in the coastal regions,53 certainly gave
legitimacy to such an endeavor. Indeed, Sultan Khalifatullah Inayat Syah of Muko-
Muko is praised in the Syair Mukomuko for embracing the religious reforms: "... strict
in his duties towards the Muslim brotherhood he enforced the religious law
throughout the negeri."54 On the whole, Anak Sungai's shift to patrilinear succession
was part of a long-term tendency, first observed by Wilken at the end of the nineteenth
century, that indicated formerly matrilineal Malay societies of Sumatra, especially in
the coastlands, were losing their "matriarchal" structure due to outside influences.
As we have already seen, Zainal Abidin's mother accompanied him on his
flight from the British. Perhaps more precisely, and according to matrilinear practice as
well as concepts of inheritance and legitimacy, one should say that she accompanied
his sister, Tenku Putri, who had married Pamanaka Sutan of Pangkalan Jambu and
who might eventually become the mother of the next heir apparent of the legitimate
Sultan of Anak Sungai. The younger brothers of Zainal Abidin, Sutan Sidi and Sutan
Assin, came along as well, enhancing the number of maternal uncles of the future
Sultan and completing the core of the royal matriclan that started its trek across the
Barisan to the gold mines of Pangkalan Jambu. All in all ninety people joined Zainal
Abidin's party, including his own wife and children.56 These latter eventually ended
up staying on the coast. Obviously, matrilinear ties superseded the attachment to
husband and father in their case as well.
The Highland Alliance
What the British at the time called "rebels" were in fact a number of powerful
highland chiefs, among them Pemuncak Pamanaka Sutan, Tuanku Mudo Zainal
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Abidin and his brothers, and the Depati of Koto Tegoh in Sungai Tenang, who had
allied with one another to control the highland Jambi gold trade and increase gold-
production. This becomes evident from the whole plot as it resurfaces throughout the
sources. This alliance was a coalition of complementary interests. Its raid on villages
close to Ipuh in 1804 and its subsequent defeat at the hands of a British punitive
expedition provide glimpses into how these interests intersected at a moment shortly
before the alliance began to fall apart.
On February 26,1805, a battle took place in a swamp on the forested slopes of
the volcano Gunung Masurai, close to the village of Koto Tegoh in Sungai Tenang. It
opposed three hundred to four hundred armed men from the highlands to a force of
the East India Company numbering little more than a hundred. The Sumatrans had
blocked the path with huge felled trees and built entrenchments. From here they shot
at the enemy. The Buginese soldiers in the service of the EIC had hauled a heavy
mortar all the way from the coast over the steep flanks of the Barisan mountains. It
proved rather inefficient in the thick of the woods. Yet the battle was soon decided in
favor of the better organized foreigners when a number of their troops bypassed the
Sumatrans and attacked them from the rear.
It was the first battle in the highlands opposing a European power against
Sumatrans. But this historical fact did not give Sungai Tenang any prominence as a
goal of colonial expansion. Its short moment in colonial history would be all but
forgotten, had not William Marsden included the expedition leader's diary in his
History of Sumatra.57 It had taken the British eighteen years to defeat an alliance of
highland chiefs that had in no small measure contributed to the decline of their
possessions on the west coast. Yet the main damage the alliance had inflicted upon the
EIC hadn't been its raids on west coast villages, but the diversion of the gold trade to
the east. And the victory on the battlefield did not reverse this shift.
Pemuncak Pamanaka Sutan of Pangkalan Jambu
The central figure of the highland alliance was a man referred to in the sources
sometimes as "Pa Muncha" or "Pomancha" and sometimes as "Pamanaka Sutan." He
is characterized by Barnes as a "powerful Chieftain" who had founded the first
permanent settlement in Pangkalan Jambu sometime between 1770 and 1780. It is this
settlement, with many others that were subsequently founded in the area, that
attracted settlers from the west coast and that contributed to the decline of the pepper
plantations under the control of the EIC. Before, the mines had been visited only
seasonally.58 After being settled permanently by peasant families, Pangkalan Jambu
appears to have attracted many professional gold miners from Minangkabau. Until
today it stands out as a place with strong Minangkabau influence, made visible by
huge waterwheels that lift irrigation water from the river on to the level of the rice
fields. Such waterwheels are a familiar sight in Minangkabau, but they occur nowhere
else in highland Jambi.
We have no direct information as to where this Pa Muncha actually came from
before he settled at Pangkalan Jambu. But one of his names gives a clue. It is obviously
57
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the misspelled title Pemuncak. In highland Jambi, the heads of a federation were
sometimes called Pemuncak.59 The title was also frequently used in the Minangkabau
heartland, albeit as a mere ceremonial title or gelar, not referring to a head of
federation.60 In Sungai Tenang, too, the head of the encompassing federation had the
title Pemuncak, before the Dutch, in the course of a sweeping standardization of self-
rule principles, replaced it with the title Pasirah. The local specificity of the title as a
prestigious honorific makes it highly probable that Pamanaka Sutan was a local chief
who had moved to the nearby gold-mining area.
This Pemuncak was married at least three times. By his first wife he had two
sons, Raja Brahim and Sutan Tukada Ullah. We don't know if they were ever allies of
their father, but after the death of their father they appear to have turned against the
remaining allies, Zainal Abidin's younger brothers Sutan Assin and Sutan Sidi. That
the Pemuncak's own sons should not have endorsed their father is not surprising in
matrilinear highland Jambi. His later marriages especially may have estranged his first
wife's kin-group, and along with them his own sons. These later marriages were to
Zainal Abidin's sister Tenku Putri, as we already know, and to a daughter of the
Depati of Koto Tegoh. Both these marriages provided him with strong and committed
allies. He needed them to promote immigration from the west coast to his settlement at
Pangkalan Jambu—by force, if necessary, but perhaps initially also by using ties of
kinship and loyalty of west coast inhabitants to the legitimate Sultan of Anak Sungai.
He needed these followers to grow rice and vegetables to have ample food supplies, a
fundamental condition if one hoped to attract permanently large numbers of miners
and traders.
Everything indicates that the Pemuncak Pamanaka Sutan was the one man who
held the highland alliance together, and that it fell apart after his death around 1811. Its
breakdown becomes apparent in the fact that the hostilities with the west coast, its
favorite cause, came immediately to a halt after 1811.61
The settlements at Pangkalan Jambu seem to have grown throughout the
nineteenth century. By the end of the century, the center of power as well as the
toponym "Pangkalan Jambu" had moved downriver, closer to Muara Mesumai, the
present-day Bangko. Here was the home of the powerful Pengeran Temenggung, the
most important ally of Sultan Taha of Jambi during his long exile and war against the
Dutch. He ruled over all federations along the Merangin and Mesumai, from Kerinci
almost to the confluence of the Merangin with the Tembesi at Pauh.62
The Depati of Koto Tegoh
The second strong figure in the alliance was the Depati of Koto Tegoh. We
know of him only through the report of Hastings Dare, where he is called a "principal
instigator of the disturbances." He must have joined the alliance some time after
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1789; since had he already become the Pemuncak's father-in-law by that time, he
certainly would have helped Zainal Abidin, the Pemuncak's brother-in-law, after his
flight from Muko-Muko. Zainal Abidin might rather have taken refuge with his
relation in Koto Tegoh instead of in nearby Serampas, where he soon overstayed his
welcome, eventually killing two of his hosts. It is therefore likely that the Depati of
Koto Tegoh joined the alliance only after Pemuncak Pamanaka Sutan and Zainal
Abidin had united in Pangkalan Jambu and from there started their raids on the west
coast.
The Depati of Koto Tegoh's personal interests in taking part in the raids on the
west coast are not at all evident. After the decline of the gold trade across the Barisan,
of which he controlled a strategic bottle-neck, he may have sought alternative sources
of wealth. He may have had a personal motive in strengthening his leadership by
having a large number of dependents who could work for his household and who,
maybe, could engage in some sort of commercial activity, like growing cassia for sale
or digging for gold in his son-in-law's mines. Or he may have sold his share of the
enslaved west-coast people. We do know that after the battle of 1805, the chiefs of
Sungai Tenang returned the Depati of Koto Tegoh's share of the abducted villagers to
the west coast, thus renouncing any profit that had accrued to them through the
alliance.64
His political motives are more obvious. It is likely that the Depati of Koto Tegoh
had taken the initiative in a political situation that forced all of Sungai Tenang and
Serampas into the arms of the alliance. The shift of highland trade from the west coast
to the east coast had strong implications for these areas that lie astride the Barisan. It
meant that the trade routes linking the gold-producing areas along the Limun and of
Batin Pengambang along the Batang Asai to the markets of Muko-Muko and Indrapura
became deserted, and only local people would use them further to bring essential
goods into their highland villages. Therefore the need to maintain and pacify the route
became a local affair, too, and no alliance with a strong outside partner would facilitate
the endeavor.
Sungai Tenang's involvement with the highland alliance of Pangkalan Jambu
was thus a consequence of these changed circumstances. During the heyday of the
"rebel" alliance, between about 1790 and 1811, the chiefs at Pangkalan Jambu used the
route through Sungai Tenang and Serampas for slave-raiding on a part of the west
coast where they had nothing to lose in terms of business connections. These raids thus
ultimately reflect the reorientation of highland Jambi's trade-relationships towards the
east coast of Sumatra and the Straits of Malakka. For the people of Sungai Tenang,
participation in these raids was a political, not an economic necessity, for, having lost
their economic clout as controllers of a trade route, they had to avoid being sacked
themselves. Apart from the Depati of Koto Tegoh and his immediate followers, the
inhabitants of Sungai Tenang and Serampas were probably rather reluctant partners of
the alliance, and their overall attitude may have been disapproval of the raids, since
they made it difficult for highland people to frequent the markets on the west coast.
Two circumstances reflect this reluctance. First, the people of Serampas readily assisted
Hastings Dare while he prepared his assault on the alliance.65 The memory of Zainal
Abidin killing two Depati of Serampas in 1789 certainly contributed to their friendly
64
 Hashim et al., The Syair Mukomuko, p. 21.
65 Dare, "Expedition to the Serampei and Sungei-tenang Countries," p. 318.
114 Heinzpeter Znoj
attitude. Secondly, it seems likely from Hastings Dare's account of the speedy
conclusion of a peace treaty between the EIC and Sungai Tenang, that the inhabitants
of Sungai Tenang were in fact relieved at the course of events.66
The outcome of the whole affair for Sungai Tenang is difficult to guess, since no
known sources have survived, and there are also no oral accounts. According to Dutch
sources, Muko-Muko again became, after its demise in the final decades of EIC rule,
and after the Dutch reduced the role of the Sultan, a very important market for the
interior. From the 1830s until the end of the nineteenth century, it attracted traders
from as far as Batang Asai, Limun, Pangkalan Jambu and Kerinci.67 It thus appears that
after an interlude of several decades highland Jambi's trading preferences reverted to
what they had been before the revolt of Tuanku Mudo Zainal Abidin. Old people in
Sungai Tenang still remember the narratives of their parents and grandparents relating
that up to the turn of the twentieth century, before there were safely accessible markets
in Kerinci, Bangko and Sarolangun, it was to Muko-Muko that people turned to buy
and sell.
Tuanku Mudo Zainal Abidin and His Brothers
The third central figure in the alliance, and the one most familiar to us, was the
heir apparent of the Sultanate of Anak Sungai, Tuanku Mudo Zainal Abidin. When the
attack on the villages close to Ipuh took place in 1804, he had been dead for about six
years, and it was his younger brothers Sutan Assin and Sutan Sidi who were the
partners of the Pemuncak and the Depati of Koto Tegoh.
As we have seen, Zainal Abidin had started his alliance-building in the
highlands even before he had broken with the Sultan and the EIC. The marriage of his
sister Tenku Putri to Pamanaka Sutan is enough evidence for this. Immediately after
the outbreak of the conflict he sought allies in Serampas and later in Tapan and Pulo
Sangkar along the way from Kerinci to Indrapura.68 Later the alliance was extended to
Sungai Tenang and may at one point even have included the gold-producing areas of
Batang Asai. It is conceivable—and as we are speaking of individuals engaged in the
gold trade, which is so sensitive to security of trade routes, even likely—that at its peak
the alliance was an important part of a wider network of alliances throughout the
tributaries of the Batang Hari and perhaps even the Indragiri and the Musi, which
secured a lively trade completely outside the control of the coastal Sultanates and
European trading companies. The marriage of Zainal Abidin's younger brother Sutan
Sidi in Jambi town can be seen as a move to secure a privileged outlet for Pangkalan
Jambu's gold at that port. Zainal Abidin's immediate motive for fostering the alliance
therefore appears to have been the control of gold trade, but he certainly shared
Pamanaka Sutan's interest in making Pangkalan Jambu great by attracting more
people.
Zainal Abidin's move, some time after his defeat in Anak Sungai, to Pangkalan
Jambu, the then most important source of gold in highland Jambi, follows a familiar
pattern in Sumatran history. Like many a rebellious heir apparent of a downstream
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ruler, he located himself close to the upstream sources of wealth and helped divert the
flow of upstream goods to a different port. Obviously, he now played on the good
strategic position of Pangkalan Jambu, whose produce was vied for by the Sultan of
Jambi (the nominal owner of the mines), by the Dutch in Indrapura, the British in
Muko-Muko, and by the private traders in Penang. Penang attracted much business by
the end of the nineteenth century, and Sumatra's gold was in high demand there. As
Dobbin notes, Penang supplied many small east coast ports—Jambi among others—
with goods.69
Yet in Zainal Abidin's case, the shift of the locus of enterprise from the coast to
the interior reflects something more than the upstream-downstream dynamic, since it
is at the same time a shift from mercantile control of flows of trade to control and
development of the production site itself. Even if it took place under chaotic
circumstances, and initially against the will of the Tuanku Mudo himself, it is
nevertheless a perfect example of what happened in the whole of central Sumatra at
the time, from Minangkabau down to the Bengkulu coast. In the 1780s, pepper
growing became a desperate concern on the Bengkulu coast, and also on the Dutch-
controlled west coast further north, as a free-trade regime in Aceh and Penang started
to drive pepper prices down.70 The pepper growers of the immediate hinterland on the
west coast lost their purchasing power. At the same time, highland products like
cassia, coffee, and gambir became more frequently traded. This shift in products and
production sites went hand in hand with the migration back to the highlands of part of
the coastal population that had previously settled there because of the pepper boom.
As we have seen, these population movements often took the form of so-called
"slave" raids. I am reluctant to use this word without qualification. As Anthony Reid
has argued, for poor peasants in Southeast Asia in historical times, "security and
opportunity depended upon being bonded to somebody strong enough to look after
them."71 For peasant families who were intent on leaving the west coast due to the
economic decline there, to move to a more promising place in the highlands was only
possible if their survival during the first rice season was guaranteed by somebody able
to provide them with land and rice. In return they would be bonded to him, sell him
their produce at his terms and work for him for cheap wages. Their bondage certainly
meant a loss of freedom. But they may have lost it anyway on the west coast, where at
the turn of the nineteenth century the practice of debt-bondage became more and more
widespread as did the practice of "escaping" to the highlands.72
The alliance of the chiefs of Pangkalan Jambu thus increased the number of
dependent peasant families in the vicinity of the gold mines with a system of forced
immigration. The abducted villagers were shared among the participants of the raids.
Politically, the acquisition of farming followers by many individual mining and
trading entrepreneurs led to open competition for power among many contestants, a
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situation conveyed by Barnes's travel account.73 Zainal Abidin at least found himself in
politically much more volatile setting than he had known on the west coast under
British control. His main assets in the power game at Pangkalan Jambu were his close
relationship to the founder of the settlement and his ability to provide it with new
immigrants from the west coast.
At the time of Barnes's visit to Kerinci and Pangkalan Jambu in 1818, little was
left of this particular alliance. Sutan Sidi and Sutan Assin had left Pangkalan Jambu
and lived impoverished in Jambi and some other place further downstream,
respectively.74 After Zainal Abidin's death in 1798, Sutan Assin may have succeeded
his elder brother, and if such a succession indeed took place it is likely to have been
endorsed by the Pemuncak, since six years later the two brothers were still his allies.
Their interest in moving the populations of at least a few villages from the west coast
to Pangkalan Jambu can therefore be seen as the substantiation of their claim to
represent the legitimate Sultanate of Anak Sungai. Their raids were mounted with a
secure sense of political authority. Yet it is likely that these relocated people did not
continue to view themselves as dependents of the Sultan after Sutan Sidi and Sutan
Assin had left Pangkalan Jambu, since, according to Barnes, the two had "sold" the
relocated peasants. After the loss of the battle of Koto Tegoh in 1805, which had
deprived Sutan Sidi and Sutan Assin of their capability to provide large numbers of
immigrants from the west coast and after the death of their brother-in-law Pemuncak
Pamanaka Sutan around 1811, their political assets at Pangkalan Jambu were greatly
reduced. Conceivably, a son of the Pemuncak Pamanaka Sutan and his wife Tenku
Putri may have succeeded to the "rebel" title of Sultan of Anak Sungai, after his two
mamak or mother's brothers had left behind their dependents. We don't know if such a
successor indeed existed, and if he existed, whether he could still claim any
dependents. We only know that at the time of Barnes's visit in 1818, Tenku Putri, the
Pemuncak's widow, still lived in Birun, a village close to Pangkalan Jambu, together
with some eighty people from Ipuh. According to Barnes they all were eager to return
to Ipuh but were not allowed to leave.75 This suggests that the "rebel" Sultanate of
Anak Sungai had by then indeed lost all power over its former dependents. The three
remaining siblings lived widely dispersed, sick, poor, old and unrespected—stranded
in the failed attempt to save their Sultanate.
However, the Pemuncak's sons, Sutan Tukada Ullah and Raja Brahim, were
important chiefs in Pangkalan Jambu, though neither inherited the title Pemuncak—
which is not surprising if one supposes that matrilineal inheritance principles
determined the succession to titles. Raja Brahim was the head of the "Padri" with the
title Tuanku Malim, while a certain Pangulu Mudo was the principal chief of
Pangkalan Jambu.76
The Islamic Reform Movement in Pangkalan Jambu
When the "rebel" alliance crumbled after the death of Pemuncak Pamanaka
Sutan, this was only partly due to the defeat, in 1805, in the battle of Koto Tegoh and
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the subsequent loss of their ability to provide new settlers. Other factors also played a
part. In particular, we note that a religious movement identical with or akin to the
Wahhabi-influenced Padri movement in Minangkabau had made its appearance at
Pangkalan Jambu around this time, and it is likely that this movement actively brought
down what remained of the "rebel" Sultanate and the alliance it was part of.
The Wahhabi-inspired reform movement originated in Minangkabau in the first
years of the nineteenth century. The strong immigration of Minangkabau into highland
Jambi in the course of the gold boom makes it probable that the movement quickly
spread along the main trading routes in highland Jambi. Making this assertion, I
disagree with Christine Dobbin, who writes in her book on Minangkabau: "The Padri
movement made no impact to the south of the Minangkabau heartland. The adjoining
regions of Sungai Pagu and Kerinci, although peopled by Minangkabau, were hilly,
isolated and sparsely settled."77 Other scholars have tended to agree with Dobbin's
judgment that the Wahhabi or Padri movement of the early 1800s had little direct
impact on highland Jambi. Jeya Kathirithamby-Wells, who edited the most important
European early nineteenth-century source on Kerinci, Barnes's travel account of 1818,
argues that Barnes's mention of Padri in Kerinci and Pangkalan Jambu refers not to the
Padri movement specifically but only vaguely to any religious authority.78 She points
out that the term "Padri" was in use in Southwestern Sumatra as early as the first
quarter of the eighteenth century.79 Bickmore mentions three Padri from the area of
Danau Kerinci who upon their return from Mecca in 1807 initiated religious reforms.80
But Bickmore's story as a whole refers to the developments in Minangkabau and it is
therefore doubtful evidence for the Padri movement's presence in Kerinci.81
Nevertheless, the sharp changes in daily life in Kerinci which took place
between the visits of Campbell in 180082 and Barnes in 1818, changes that altered it
from a society where men wore colorful dresses and staged frequent festivities and
cockfights, while unmarried women would also talk to strangers, to a society where
everybody was clad in simple black clothes, festive entertainments like dance, music,
drink and gambling were forbidden, and women never appeared in public, testify to
the kind of revolution in habitus that was the trademark of the Wahhabi reform
movement. It may have reached Kerinci more or less independently of and even prior
to parallel movements in Minangkabau. Watson mentions reformist initiatives by the
Sultan of Jambi late in the eighteenth century that could have paved the way for a local
Wahhabi-inspired reformist movement.83 Later in the nineteenth century, there was a
reformist Islamic center in Rawang in northern Kerinci that was frequently at war with
other villages and that displayed similar characteristics of religious orthodoxy.84 On
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the other hand, in the southern parts of Kerinci, there are late nineteenth-century
sources that describe a strong adherence to the old local animist and ancestral cults,
and widespread Islamic reforms occurring only in the last decades of the century.85 In
short, at least parts of the Jambi highlands experienced the same repeated waves of
religious reform that took place simultaneously in the highlands of Minangkabau.86
Even if it wasn't exactly the same movement as in Minangkabau, it would have been a
very similar movement that arose out of similar causes.
There is a debate about the specific causes that led to the revolutionary religious
changes and political upheavals in the highlands of central Sumatra around the turn of
the nineteenth century. Christine Dobbin offered an explanation based on the
coincidence of these movements with the establishment of widespread cash-cropping
for export. Trade in these cash crops necessitated a new commercial code of conduct
and economic discipline, both of which were eventually found in Islamic rules and
practice.87 She describes how the Minangkabau highlands in particular experienced an
economic boom due to the cultivation of such export crops as cassia, coffee, and
gambir. According to Dobbin, this boom was accompanied by the establishment of a
new regime of small-scale production and trade, independent of and in competition to
the court system that had evolved around the exploitation of the gold mines. This older
highland economy had included a regional division of labor and an elaborate market
system in which such essentials as iron, rice, and cloth were produced and traded. The
royal family had dominated and secured the gold trade, which supplied the internal
market of the highlands with imported goods. The expansion of cash-crop production
rendered the acquisition of imported wealth independent of gold trade, and, hence,
more democratic in principle. A new class of small-scale traders arose that wanted to
get rid of the court system and the costly prestige consumption attached to it, which
had impeded free trade. Islam offered a code of commercial conduct that could solve
the regulatory crisis that such widespread commercialization brought about. In the
absence of a supra-village enforceable contract-law, the shariah offered a viable
alternative to the established system. According to Dobbin, the success of Islamic
reformist movements among the small traders and cash-crop producers of the
highlands during the boom years of free trade at the turn of the nineteenth century, as
well as the concomitant decline of the court system, testify to the popularity of at least
the economic changes offered by strict adherence to Islamic principles.
Bill Watson, in contrast, makes the good point that it is hard to imagine that the
Minangkabau did not have a viable commercial code before they adopted Islamic rules
of conduct. As evidence he cites traditional maxims governing property and trading
practices.88 Moreover, one can argue alongside Watson that the Wahhabi reformers did
not restrict themselves to the regulation of small-scale trade financed by the new cash-
crops. They made it a point of special interest to control and reform the gold mines,
which had not only given rise to the court system but were also a hotbed of animist
beliefs and practices that had to be repressed. And finally, as was the case for Imam
Bonjol, the most famous and successful leader of the Padri, they profited from the
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mines in the same manner as had the court of Pagar Ruyung. Watson points to the
fact that Islam offered venues of prestige for men who were excluded from fast ascent
to higher social status due to their age and position in the local clans. In a booming
commercial situation of the kind that existed at the turn of the nineteenth century in
the highlands of Sumatra, ambitious individuals, especially industrious young men,
could rely more on their own resources and were less tied up in the web of solidarity
and social control of their villages and clans than previous generations had been. They
could risk living according to their religious convictions, among other things. The
Wahhabi movement from Mecca, which was spread to the Sumatran highlands by a
few charismatic personalities and which stood in an already long tradition of religious
reform, acquired its extraordinary dynamism because such people responded readily
to the opportunities it offered. Watson's argument thus tries to make room for a proper
dynamic of religious development, while acknowledging the overall importance of
economic integration for the process. He favors an explanation based on social changes
brought about by the emergence of a class of rich men who were unable to express
their power within the political system of inherited authority, and who embraced first
the Hajj and from there the Islamic reform movements originating in Mecca as a
vehicle for personal prestige. I would add to these economic reasons the mobilization
of spiritual resistance against anticipated European intrusion, as I will argue below.
Incidentally, the Rao gold mines close to Bonjol at the northern fringes of
Minangkabau offer a closer parallel to the developments in Kerinci and Pangkalan
Jambu than does the Minangkabau heartland itself. Bonjol was located strategically
between Dutch and British interests in a manner similar to Pangkalan Jambu, and it
was equally able to build a regional commercial empire based on the admixture of
reformist Islamic policing of trade and the lucrative exploitation of gold mines. As in
Bonjol, the Malim at Pangkalan Jambu did not replace all local political leaders,
although they certainly tried to dominate them.90 Both centers enjoyed a period of
prosperity after the Padri had taken over from the local elite. By the time of Barnes's
visit, the Islamic leaders had turned Pangkalan Jambu into a major market place that
channeled the trade to and from Jambi, Minangkabau, Kerinci, Indrapura and Batang
Asai.91
Barnes's ill-fated expedition provides us with some insights into the everyday
politics of the reform movement. Barnes had received orders from Raffles to cross the
island from Indrapura to Jambi. He took the obvious and well-frequented route
through Kerinci and along the Merangin, then crossing over into the valley of the
Mesumai. He hoped to pass through Pangkalan Jambu and take rafts and boats to
Jambi a few days downstream of this place. After a very friendly welcome in Lempur,
a group of villages related to Serampas, Barnes's journey was slowed in Pulo Sangkar,
not far from Lake Kerinci. Here he met Raja Brahim, the chief of the Padri, and Sutan
Tukada Ullah, the sons of the late Pemuncak Pamanaka Sutan, who promised to take
him to Pangkalan Jambu, where they lived, and onward further downstream. What
followed was a protracted highway robbery during which the two brothers patiently
extorted all the cash Barnes carried with him as payment for carriers and duties to
village chiefs along the way. Barnes ended up spending one month, and all the money
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he had left (a total of £ 800), in Pangkalan Jambu.92 On entering the plain of Pangkalan
Jambu, Barnes's party was forced by the Padri to cross to the far side of the river in
order to pass a mosque;93 and later on it was the Padri who vehemently opposed the
passage of the Europeans on to Jambi. At the end, it seems as if Raja Brahim and Sutan
Tukada Ullah had never intended to lead Barnes's party to Jambi. To the contrary, they
seemed determined to make sure that his own troops deserted him and that he would
be forced to return to the west coast empty-handed. Barnes of course felt humiliated at
the treatment he suffered, and he nursed revengeful fantasies about bringing the
highlands under control with a network of military roads. The attitude of the chiefs of
Pangkalan Jambu clearly reflects a policy of discouraging the European powers from
entering the highlands and a religiously expressed animosity.
This very same combination of religious antipathy and political resistance
would motivate the Padri movement in Minangkabau to wage a long-lasting war
against the Dutch invaders a few years later. And these responses were at the heart of
the Aceh war in the last third of the nineteenth century, and of the anti-Dutch
movements in highland Jambi at the turn of the twentieth century, led by Sultan Taha,
and again in 1916, during the Serikat Abang rebellion.941 think it is no coincidence that
all these religious movements in the highlands took place in areas the colonial powers
had started to single out as the prizes of Sumatra. They have, in my opinion, to be
understood in part as spiritual resistance movements genuinely directed against the
European colonialists. If one perceives them as reactions to the projection of European
power, it is surely not astonishing to find that the Islamic movements in the highlands
were strongest where the interest of the Europeans were strongest too. When the
reformists created Islamic "fortresses" against European expansion in the centers of
trade and market-production, it was not so much because they had to give themselves
an Islamic code of commercial conduct, as Dobbin argues, but because these were the
places most in need of protection from European conquest. The European desire to
enter the highlands, which became stronger with the decline of the west coast
economy, did not go unnoticed in the highlands. It provoked a spiritual mobilization
against this European ambition long before the Europeans physically conquered the
highlands.
Conclusion
More broadly, the information that a reform movement akin to that of the Padri
movement did indeed reach the Jambi highlands, and in particular the gold mines of
Pangkalan Jambu, sheds some light on later historical developments. Christine Dobbin
has shown that the old Padri villages in Minangkabau continued to be at the forefront
of Islamic developments up to the twentieth century and that they also played
important roles in the mobilization of political resistance against the Dutch and indeed
in the struggle for Indonesian independence.95 The same may be true for the southern
part of Central Sumatra, the Jambi highlands. It would then not be so surprising to find
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Kerinci at war with Dutch conquerors at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nor
would it be a shock to discover that the area downstream of Pangkalan Jambu and
along the Tembesi and the Batang Asai had been engaged in fierce resistance against
the Dutch, first in a long guerrilla war at the side of Sultan Taha at the end of the
nineteenth century, and later in the Serikat Abang rebellion of 1916.96
Other areas in the highlands, like Serampas and Sungai Tenang, were situated
outside the main trade routes, and so were untouched by the influence of the Wahhabi
movement during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Dutch witnesses of the
state of Islamic practices at the turn of the twentieth century suggest that this particular
brand of Islamic reformism had at least left no lasting impression there.97 These areas
also never took part in anti-Dutch resistance movements. The particular geography of
resistance to Dutch rule in Jambi at the turn of the twentieth century is therefore
ultimately linked to the existence of a web of strong alliances that controlled the gold
trade in highland Jambi since the end of the eighteenth century and that came under
the influence of an equally strong religious reform movement shortly after 1800.
Tuanku Mudo Zainal Abidin's rebellion against the British was one of the
narratives that nursed a spirit of resistance against the Europeans in highland Jambi.
The Wahhabi-inspired movement reinforced it with a strong sense of Islamic identity.
And the arrival of the Dutch in the highlands in 1901 was the long-expected event that
called for the mobilization of this spiritually grounded resistance.
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